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Scott: Labor Relations: Defamation--Libel Liability Limited

CASE COMMENTS
LABOR RELATIONS: DEFAMATION-LIBEL LIABILITY LIMITED*
Local 496, Letter Carriers v. Austin, 94 S. Ct. 2770 (1974)
As part of its effort to organize nonmember letter carriers, appellant
union, the recognized exclusive collective bargaining representative for
carriers in Richmond, Virginia, published a list of scabs in its monthly newsletter and prefaced it with a pejorative definition of "scab." Appellees,
whose names were included on the list, brought libel actions against the
union and its national affiliate under the Virginia "insulting words"
statute,' and judgments in favor of appellees were affirmed by the Virginia
supreme court.2 On appeal, the unions contended that their statements
were protected by the federal labor laws and the first amendment and
that the state courts had misconstrued the preemptive effect and malice
standard of Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, Local 114.3 The United States
Supreme Court reversed, 4 and HELD, the instruction containing the common
law definition of "malice" was erroneous because federal labor laws preempt
state libel laws unless defamatory statements in labor relations are published
with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard for truth. 5
*EDITOR'S NoTE: This case comment was awarded the George W. Milam Award as the
outstanding case comment submitted in the fall 1974 quarter.
1. VA. CODE ANN. §8-630 (1957).
2. Local 496, Letter Carriers v. Austin, 213 Va. 377, 192 S.E.2d 737 (1972).
3. 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
4. 94 S. Ct. 2770 (1974). Justice Douglas concurred; Justice Powell, joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, dissented (companion case to Gertz v. Welch, Inc.,
94 S. Ct. 2997 (1974)). No dispute existed between labor and management or between
competing unions, nor was there any effort to encourage defection from the appellant
union. Of 435 letter carriers in the unit, all but 15 were union members. The list of
scabs, which was admittedly designed to force the nonunion carriers to join, had been
published twice before, and it was subsequent to a complaint by appellee Austin to both
management and union officials that the issue containing the purported definition was
published. 94 S. Ct. at 2773. Although labor relations in the postal service are currently
under the regulation of the National Labor Relations Act and the NLRB, at the time
this case arose Executive Order 11491 was controlling. Both the defendants and the dissenting Justices conceded that the Executive order and the Act are essentially equivalent,
and the Court found no persuasive reason to differentiate between them in determining
their preemptive impact on state libel laws. Id. at 2776-77. The Court alternately held
there was no actual defamation because the only factual statement made (that appellees
were scabs) was literally true. The rest of the statement, which was a piece of trade union
literature attributed to Jack London was considered "rhetorical hyperbole" by the Court.
Id. at 2782. The dissent maintained that the majority should have distinguished between
a defamatory description of an anonymous group and a similar characterization of a
specified individual. Id. at 2787 (Powell, J., dissenting).
5. This is the definition of "actual malice" enunciated in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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The concept of federal preemption of jurisdiction in labor relations6
began to develop in 1935 as a result of the passage of the Wagner Act, 7 which
caused state and federal labor legislation to overlap. Initially, courts allowed
state and federal regulation in the same area and asserted federal preemption
only in cases of direct conflict." Later, however, exclusive federal jurisdiction
was recognized 9 in those areas where federal labor law either protected 0 or
prohibited", activity,12 although state regulation was still permitted outside
these areas." Federal preemption was further extended in San Diego Building
Trades Council v. Garmon,'4 which established the primary jurisdiction of

6. See generally Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HAzv. L. REv. 1337 (1972);
Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARV. L. Rav. 1297 (1954); Lesnick,
Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72 CoLums. L. R.v. 469
(1972); Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction Over Labor Relations: 1, 59 Corm. L. Ray. 6 (1959).
7. Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, §§1 et seq., 49 Stat. 452.
8. E.g., Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 380 U.S. 767, 77374 (1947); Allen-Bradley Local 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S.
740, 751 (1942); Sinnot v. Davenport, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 227, 243 (1859).
9. Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 500-01 (1953).
10. E.g., Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957) (state not allowed to enjoin
peaceful picketing and patrolling of respondent's premises); UAW v. O'Brien, 339 U.S.
454 (1950) (state not permitted concurrent regulation of peaceful strikes for higher Wages);
Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945) (sanctions imposed under Florida statute
requiring annual reports and $1.00 fee of every labor union operating in the state held
to circumscribe the freedom of choice of collective bargaining agents).
11. E.g., Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957) (union filed charges
of unfair labor practices with the NLRB, which declined to exercise its jurisdiction; held,
state board's jurisdiction was still preempted); Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468
(1955) (union strike to force an employer to assign particular work to its members constituted
prohibited unfair labor practice and, as such, state jurisdiction was preempted); Garner v.
Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953) (picketing by union to coerce employers to compel
or influence their employees to join the union held to be within the jurisdiction of the NLRB
to prevent unfair labor practices and thus state courts were precluded from intervening).
Contra, United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954) (employer
brought a common law tort action in the Virginia state courts for damages against three
labor unions for conduct involving threats of violence; although such conduct constituted
an unfair labor practice prohibited by the NLRA, the Court upheld the applicability of
state law).
12. Activities protected by §157 and prohibited by §158 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§151 et seq. (1970).
13. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 620 (1958); UAW
Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245, 265 (1949) (Briggs-Stratton
case).
14. 359 US. 236 (1959). The petitioner unions wanted the respondents, copartners in
the lumber business, to agree to employ union members exclusively. When the respondents
refused, claiming one of the unions must first be selected as a bargaining agent by a
majority of the employees, the unions began peaceful picketing to compel execution of
the proposed contract. Respondents were subsequently awarded damages under California
state law for the resulting economic injuries. Since the NLRB had declined to exercise its
jurisdiction, the status of the conduct had not been adjudicated. The court held that the state
must nevertheless defer to the exclusive competence of the NLRB because the conduct
was "arguably" within its jurisdiction. Id. at 246.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol27/iss2/11

2

Scott: Labor Relations: Defamation--Libel Liability Limited
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVII

the National Labor Relations Board in areas arguably protected or prohibited by federal law. 15
The concept of federal preemption in labor affairs rests on the supremacy
of federal law-o and the need for a balanced, uniform national labor relations
policy."7 But the acknowledged existence of areas of valid state regulation",
resulted in recognition of certain exceptions to the preemption doctrine. For
example, the state's compelling interest in maintaining public order has
consistently been held to justify state regulation in cases of actual or
threatened violence, even where the conduct was clearly an unfair labor
practice prohibited by federal law.' 9 Initially, a state's interest in protecting
its citizens from defamation was also considered sufficient basis for invoking
an exception to the preemption doctrine.20 The defamation exception to
the preemption doctrine did not, however, always override the traditional
policy favoring uninhibited, robust, and wide open debate in labor disputes.2
The resultant balancing problem seemed to be resolved in Garmon by the
apparent elimination of defamation as an exception. Although the Court
acknowledged the validity of state jurisdiction in areas of peripheral concern
to federal labor policies and in matters involving deeply rooted local interests, 22 its exclusive reference to violence or threats to public order - 3 was
subsequently interpreted as authority for restricting preemption doctrine
24
exceptions to cases of actual or threatened violence.
Seven years later in Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, Local 114,25 the Su15. This extension was procedural. When it is unclear whether an activity is governed
by federal labor law, the Court held that determination of its status must be left exclusively to the NLRB. Therefore, when a case involves an activity arguably protected or
prohibited, it must first go before the NLRB. Id. at 244-45.
16. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, §2.
17. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959).
18. UAW Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245, 265 (1949)
(Briggs-Stratton case); Allen-Bradley Local 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd.,
315 U.S. 740, 748-49 (1942).
19. E.g., UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 649 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting); Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131, 138-39 (1957); United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum
Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 663-64, 669-70 (1954).
20. Cafeteria Employees Local 302 v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293, 295 (1943) (states have a
right to restrict the abusive exercise of free speech because continuing unquestionably false
representations is not a constitutional prerogative); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,
105 (1940) (states may take adequate steps to protect the rights and privacy of their citizens
when there exists a clear and present danger of invasion of such rights).
21. 320 U.S. at 295 (use of loose language or undefined slogans recognized to be part
of the usual give-and-take of economic controversies); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,
104 (1940) (states may not impair the exercise of the right to free discussion of industrial
relations that are matters of public concern).
22. 359 U.S. at 243-44.
23. Id. at 247-48.
24. Liner v. JAFCO, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 306-07 (1964); Local 207, Bridge Workers v.
Perko, 373 U.S. 701, 705-06 (1963); Local 100, Journeymen v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 693-94,
698 (1963). The majority's position in Garnion was similarly interpreted in the concurring
opinion by Justice Harlan, 359 U.S. at 253.
25. 383 U.S. 53 (1966). During a union's campaign to organize employees, leaflets
were circulated containing defamatory statements about the petitioner manager. The
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preme Court reasserted defamation as an exception to the federal preemption
doctrine. Basing its decision on the state's compelling interest in protecting
its citizens' reputations26 and on the National Labor Relations Board's inability to provide a remedy,2 7 the Court held that the state had jurisdiction
to redress libel resulting from union tactics during an organizational campaign. The availability of a state remedy for libel was not considered inconsistent with national labor policy. Because the remedies provided by
the NLRB and by the state addressed different concerns, both could be
applied in appropriate cases. 28 The Court carefully limited this preemption
exception, however, by requiring proof of damages and actual malice. 29
Thus, state redress was allowed only when the malice standard of knowing
falsity or reckless disregard for truth was met and actual damages were proved.
The adoption of these restrictive requirements made it difficult to qualify
for state jurisdiction and thereby protected the traditional freedom of speech
policies in labor disputes.
Linn was one of several indications in the decade after Garmon that the
Court might retreat from its strong preemption position. In decisions that
distinguished Garmon on the issues of fair representation," arbitration,31
and breach of contract, 32 the Court again appeared willing to extend the
exceptions category. By 1970 some members of the Court had expressed the
desire for a reexamination of the preemption doctrine. 2 In Amalgamated
employer had filed unfair labor practice charges with the NLRB, which refused to issue a
complaint. Petitioner then filed a civil libel action under state law in federal court.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal on preemption grounds, citing
Garmon, and the U. S. Supreme Court reversed in a 5-4 decision.
26. "Moreover, we believe that 'an overriding state interest' in protecting its residents
from malicious libels should be recognized in these circumstances." Id. at 61.
27. "The injury that the statement might cause to an individual's reputation . . .
has no relevance to the Board's function. The Board can award no damages, impose no
penalty, or give any other relief to the defamed individual." Id. at 63.
28. It was argued that if state action were allowed, the NLRB would be ignored. But
the Court disagreed, holding: "[i]t may be expected that the injured party will request
both administrative and judicial relief." Id. at 66.
29. Id. at 64-65. The Court adopted the New York Times malice standard by analogy
"to effectuate the statutory design with respect to preemption." Id. at 65.
30. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). A union member charged the union with breach
of its statutory duty of fair representation, which the NLRB had previously recognized as an
unfair labor practice. The Court found the conduct of settling a grievance short of arbitration not to violate the fair representation duty, but held the Garmon doctrine not applicable to the situation.
31. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964) (where there was an
agreement between union and employer containing a provision for grievance arbitration
in unresolved disputes, the Court held the state court had jurisdiction to issue an order
compelling arbitration even though an alternative remedy was available before the NLRB).
32. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962) (the alleged conduct, breach
of a collective bargaining contract between the union and employer, was conceded to be
an unfair labor practice, but the Court held the suit could be maintained by an individual
employee in the state court).
33. See Taggart v. Weinacker's, Inc., 397 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1970) (in a concurring
opinion, Chief Justice Burger suggested adding trespass to the body of decisions that
already allow states to regulate violence and defamation); Longshoremen's Local 1416 v.
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Association of Street Employees v. Lockridge,3 * however, the Court reaffirmed
its position and provided an explanation of the Garmon rule and the various
exceptions to it. Pointing out that the preemption doctrine, although of
judicial origin, is based on the presumed intent of Congress, the Court
held that the basic tenets of Garmon should not be disturbed unless altered
by congressional action or further judicial insights. 35 Accordingly, the exceptions to the rule should be narrowly interpreted and should not be construed
36
as indications of a retreat from Garmon.
The holding in the principal case, that defamatory statements in labor
relations must meet the "knowing falsity or reckless disregard of truth" malice
standard adopted in Linn, reflected the Court's decision that Linn was controlling,3 7 even though the factual setting of the two cases differed considerably.
Linn involved a defamatory statement38 made by a union against management
during an employee organizational campaign. The instant case involved a
confrontation between nonunion employees and the exclusively recognized
union during its efforts to achieve total union membership.3 9 The Court's
holding in

Linn was carefully limited so that the

existence of a union

organizing campaign and a labor dispute appeared essential for its applica-

tion. 40

The Court established the first criterion in the instant case by viewing

the union's activity as a "continuing organizational drive ' ' 4 1 and specifically
rejecting any distinction between prerecognition and postrecognition efforts.42

Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U.S. 195, 201-02 (1970) (concurring opinion by Justice White,
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart, urged that state power be preempted
only for actually protected or prohibited activities, and expressly called for a reconsideration of Garmnon to that extent).
34. 403 U.S. 274 (1971). Pursuant to a union security clause in a collective bargaining
agreement, a petitioner union procured respondent's discharge from employment on
grounds he had lost his good-standing union membership for nonpayment of dues. Although the action was arguably protected or prohibited by the National Labor Relations
Act, respondent filed suit in state court charging the union with breach of contract. The
state court awarded respondent damages, assuming that breach of contract was an exception
to the general federal preemption doctrine. The Supreme Court reversed in a 5-4 decision,
holding that the exception was not to be extended to terms of a union-employee contract
that have been implied by law.
35. Id. at 302.
36. Id. at 297.
37. 94 S. Ct. at 2774. Justice Douglas concurred only in the result, on the grounds
that all libel laws are constitutionally prohibited by the first and fourteenth amendments.
Id. at 2784.
38. 383 U.S. at 56. The leaflet stated the manager had deprived employees in Saginaw,
Michigan, of the right to vote in three NLRB elections, had robbed them of pay increases, and had been lying to the union.
39. 94 S. Ct. at 2773. The dissent noted that the union was solidly entrenched,
with 96% of the letter carriers already members. Id. at 2786.
40. "We conclude that where either party to a labor dispute circulates false and defamatory statements during a union organizing campaign, the court does have jurisdiction
to apply state remedies if the complainant pleads and proves that the statements were
made with malice and injured him." 383 U.S. at 55.
41. 94 S .Ct. at 2772.
42. Id. at 2779.
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Therefore, the application of Linn seemingly depended on whether the
instant situation constituted a labor dispute. Although union-employee disputes would apparently satisfy this prerequisite 4 3 the Court did not attempt
to assess the situation in such terms. In fact, this approach was expressly rejected. 44 The Court instead stated that adoption of the Linn standard should
depend on whether the policies of the federal labor laws protecting freedom
of speech were "significantly implicated." 45 Thus, any defamatory publication
arguably relevant to a situation in which federal free speech labor law policies
are significantly implicated will require proof of actual malice and damages
46
to qualify for the application of state remedies.
The dissent rejected the contention that the scope of the Linn rule should
be extended to the instant situation. 47 Noting that the Court in Linn was
concerned with providing individuals some protection against injury to
48
reputation in the classic situation of a labor-management confrontation
the dissent pointed out that no labor dispute existed in the instant case
until the union became discontented because the appellees were exercising
their legal right not to join the union.4 9 The majority's decision was seen as
allowing the union to create the controversy, and then to claim the Linn
malice standard as a bar to liability for defamation. Consequently, the dissent
expressed concern that both management and union would now be able to
defame the individual worker with little risk of accountability. 50
Although the dissent characterized the majority's extension of the Linn
rule as an expansion of the term "labor dispute,"5' in fact the Court simply
discarded the requirement of a labor dispute and proceeded to delineate the
boundaries within which the Linn rule would apply. According to the
majority, a defamatory publication in any situation concerning labor relations
will invoke partial preemption so long as federal labor free speech policies
are sufficiently involved.
Paradoxically, the Court's extension of the Linn exception to the preemption doctrine had an effect consistent with expansive federal preemption-a
restriction of state jurisdiction. As the initial result of the Court's decision in
Garmon, a defamation occurring during a labor dispute was considered to
be exclusively within the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB, with state jurisdiction preempted even when the NLRB chose not to exercise its authority.52
43. See the Norris-LaGuardia Act's definition, which specifically includes union-employee disputes. 29 U.S.C. §113 (1970).
44. 94 S. Ct. at 2778.
45. "[A]pplication of Linn must turn on whether the defamatory publication is made
in a context where the policies of the federal labor laws leading to protection for freedom
of speech are significantly implicated." Id.

46. Id. at 2779.
47. Id. at 2786 (Powell, J., dissenting).

48. Id. at 2785.
49. Id. at 2786. The NLRA expressly protects the right to refrain from joining in
concerted activities with fellow employees. 29 U.S.C. §157 (1970).
50. 94 S. CL at 2785 (Powell, J., dissenting).
51. Id.
52. See note 15 supra and text accompanying note 24 supra; Currier, Defamation in
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Defamation occurring outside the context of a labor dispute, however, remained solely within state jurisdiction.5 3 Linn departed from the Garmon
doctrine by recognizing only partial federal preemption in cases of defamation
during a labor dispute. 5 1 Thus, the state was allowed restricted jurisdiction-over defamation during a labor dispute as well as complete jurisdiction of
defamation not involved in labor disputes. By extending the stringent malice
standard of Linn, which had been employed to permit limited state jurisdiction in labor disputes, into the area beyond the context of such controversies,
the instant case restricts the previously unlimited state jurisdiction of defamation outside the labor dispute context 6
The principal case also effectively limits liability for defamation in labor
affairs outside the context of labor disputes. The requirement of proof of
actual malice is a much more exacting standard than that generally imposed
by state law5 7 and will be met in correspondingly fewer cases. When it cannot be met, the defamed individual will be left without a remedy, and the
perpetrator of the defamation will be immune from the consequences of his
tortious conduct, which would otherwise have been imposed under state
law. The degree to which this limitation of liability will encourage unions
or management to defame individual employees will depend in part on the
parameters of this extension of Linn, which in turn will depend on the
courts' subsequent interpretation of the flexible and somewhat ambiguous
phrase, "significantly implicated."
The instant case quite possibly extended Linn unnecessarily. The compelling state interest in protecting citizens' reputations recognized in Linn was
needlessly subordinated. It seems unlikely that federal labor policies favoring
uninhibited debate in labor disputes could be subverted by allowing state
libel laws to apply outside the context of labor disputes. Yet the Court
advanced no other reason for extending the application of Linn beyond the
labor dispute context. Furthermore, this extension was at the expense of
the individual employee. Unless the Court interprets its "significantly implicated" phrase narrowly, the instant case would realistically seem to leave
the individual largely unprotected against defamation in labor matters.
SANDRA

R. Scorr

Labor Disputes: Preemption and the New Federal Common Law, 53 VA. L. REV. 1, 11-14

(1967).
53. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
51. 383 U.S. at 55, 63. See Currier, supra note 52, at 19-20.
55. It is restricted because state jurisdiction is permitted only when malice, defined as
"knowing falsity or reckless disregard for truth," can be proved. The state libel law's definition of "malice" is not considered.
56. This applies only to the malice standard. The requirement of proof of damages
no longer constitutes a restriction in light of the Court's recent decision that states may
not allow recovery except for actual injury. Gertz v. Welch, Inc., 94 S. Ct. 2997, 3011 (1974).
57. Id. at 3008.
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